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Herbert L. Schuette* 
The heart of this paper is an evolutionary model of the processes of 
technological advance and economic growth, a rough calibration of that 
model with data on U.S. economic growth, and a comparison with neoclassical 
models of the sort initiated by Solow in his classic 1957 paper. But 
before developing the particular model it is important to set a wider 
context. 
Traditional neoclassical microeconomic theory has been subjected over 
the years to a steady and sometimes heavy stream of criticism. By and 
large, it has withstood the challenges well. In part this is because many 
of the challenges were inept, and in part because of the robustness and 
flexibility of the neoclassical perspective. But a major reason is simply 
that no alternative theoretical structure of adequate scope has been put 
forward -- as Thomas Kuhn has shov-Jn, the history of science offers abundant 
support for the generalization that 11 you can't beat something with nothing. 111 
The more salient of the complaints against neoclassical theory remain 
unanswered, but ineffective, because they were not accompanied by a serious 
proposal for reconstruction. 
Among the most serious challenges to the neoclassical perspective are 
those that relate to its treatment of the processes of change. The proto­
typical model in orthodoxy is one of full equilibrium under conditions of 
perfect and costless information. As the theory has progressed {especially 
in recent years), the meaning assigned to "equilibrium" has become less 
restrictive, and it is only (?) the calculation processes of the economic 
actors that remain perfect and costless. However, these improvements fall 
wel I short of removing the aura of artificial tranquility from the theory; 
the phenomena of change appear as mere complications, or imperfections, or 
perhaps as a reflection of a poor choi.ce of units of measurement. 
The elements of an alternative approach to change have long been 
available. They were set forth most clearly by Schumpeter, but they formed 
a part of the broad classical tradition that preceded him. At the level 
of the individual firm, the crucial element is full recognition of the 
trial-and-error character of the innovation process. At the level of an 
industry or an entire economy, it is essential to treat explicitly the 
driving force of transient profits and losses associated with disequilibrium, 
i.e., to allow to price signals a more dynamic role than that of 11 sustaining11 
equilibrium responses. 
In spite of the clear importance of these considerations, and of their 
prominent place in the intellectual history of the discipline, very little 
has been done to incorporate them in formal models. What we offer here is 
an example of such a model, a model illustrative of our app~oach to a 
formal Schumpeterian or "evolutionary" theory of economic change. At its 
present stage of development, this theory is not a fully developed "something" 
that can confront the orthodox position on a wide range of theoretical and 
empirical issues. But it is more than "nothing," and we intend to develop 
it further. 
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Our Jong run objective is to develop a family of models with the fol low­
ing broadly defined structure. 2 At any given time, the behavior of an 
individual firm is governed by its current decision rules, which link its 
actions to various environmental stimuli. While these rules may be both 
quite complex and quite sensible, they are not typically the result of a 
deliberate optimization over some sharply defined set of alternatives. 
And while the rules may yield considerable variation of behavior in a 
changing environment, the firm's repertory of actions is typically quite 
I imited in relation to what an outside observer would judge to be "possible.'' 
The plausibility of this characterization has, we think, been adequately 
establ isheq by the work on the "behavioral theory of the firm'' (see Cyert 
and March). 
In the longer run, two classes of dynamic mechanisms are at work. At 
the firm level, rule change may occur through processes of deliberate 
problem-solving (e.g., research and development), perhaps involving some 
imitation of the observed success of other firms. Or it may ''just happen," 
as particular capabilities in the firm improve through use (learning by 
doing), deteriorate through disuse, or are adapted to changed input 
characteristics. We use the term "search" to denote these rule change 
processes at the firm level. At the level of a market or a whole economy, 
aggregate outcomes change as a consequence of the economic selection 
mechanism -- the change in the weighting of different rules that comes about 
through the expansion of firms with profitable rules and the contraction of 
firms with unprofitable ones. The selection mechanism operates at any 
particular time only on the set of rules actually e~ployed at that time 
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by functioning firms, but this set is modified over time both by the search 
activities of firms in business and by the appearance of new firms, i.e., 
by entry. 
In 11 Satisficing, Selection and the Innovating Remnant" (Winter, 1971), 
a specific model of this type is set forth. A firm's decision rule is its 
productive technique, which can be operated at any scale. It is shown that 
if the number of possible techniques is finite, and any rule that is profit­
able is ultimately tried, then the particular stochastic process defined 
by the model wi 11 converge with probability one to a conventional competitive 
equilibrium state. 3 This result is helpful because it illustrates the 
possibility of subsuming conventional equilibrium results within an alterna­
tive framework, thus indicating that radical changes at the foundations 
of our theories may be accomplished without necessarily toppling the entire 
intellectual superstructure. But, therefore, as an obvious corollary, the 
impetus for a radical shift of the foundations cannot be derived from analysis 
of long run equilibria. Rather, it must be sought in an improved understanding 
of the phenomena of economic change. 
The contrast between an evolutionary and a neoclassical perspective on 
economic change is well illustrated by the analysis in another one of the 
ancestral papers of the present effort, "A 'Diffusion' Model of International 
Productivity Differences in Manufacturing Industry" (Nelson, 1968). The 
orthodox theory assumes universal access to the same technology and that 
firms choose optimally, and looks to factor supply differences for the 
explanation of productivity differences (as in Arrow, Chenery, Minhas, and 
So low). In contrast, the diffusion model treats economic development as 
an adaptive, not a maximizing, process and views both growth and cross-country 
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productivity differences in terms of a pervasive disequilibrium. It is not 
a matter oi different positions on the same isoquants; it is a matter of 
evolutionary change in the mix of firms of very different types. 
In the present paper, we develop the same sort of contrast between an 
orthodox interpretation and an evolutionary one. This time the empirical 
arena in U.S. economic growth is the first half of the 20th century. The 
orthodox analysis employed for purposes of comparison is that presented in 
Solow's classic 1957 article "Technical Change and the Aggregate Production 
Function." The evolutionary model employed consists of the logical appara­
tus set forth in "Satisficing, Selection and the Innovating Remnant; 1 modi­
fied and extended to deal explicitly with the dynamics of economic growth. 
Lacking an adequate mathematical analysis of its dynamic behavior, we have 
used computer simulation to study its workings. In another paper we develop 
a model, more simplified than the simulation model discussed here, which 
admits of mathematical manipulation (Nelson and Winter, forthcoming). 
The logical structure of the model is laid out in Section I I. Section 
111 describes the manner in which the model is linked quantitatively to the 
data underlying the Solow analysis. Sections IV and V discuss the simula­
tion results, in general and in relation to the Solow analysis. 
II 
A description of our model could proceed at a variety of different 
levels. At the most detailed level the description would include al I of 
the specific formulas and logic of the computer program, including program 
options that are not actually exercised in the simulation runs reported 
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below. Needless to say, such a description would be very lengthy, and would 
not interest most readers. For those who are interested in this level of 
detail, information will be made available upon request. The description 
here 1s at a higher level of abstraction, with many details omitted. 
The focus of the model is on the evolution of production techniques 
over time. Our principal break with neoclassical tradition I ies in our 
"behavioral" treatment of the question: Why is the firm at any time using 
the technique it is using? A neoclassical answer would be that the firm 
has chosen its technique on the basis of profitability calculations comparing 
the elements of a large choice set (production function). A behavioral ist's 
answer, and the one embodied in our model, is of a very different form. The 
production technique used by a firm at any time is regarded as a complex 
pattern of routinized behaviour, of which the input-output coefficients are a 
quantifiable aspect. The firm is not seen as, at any time, "choosing" its 
technique from a large choice set, but rather as "having" its technique. 
The technique may change over time as a result of search, but changes are 
typically smal I. When larger changes occur, it is I ikely because prominent 
other firms are using significantly different techniques, which thus provide 
a target for imitation. The forces of search are complemented, at an 
·, 
industry level, by forces of selection. Profitable firms exoand. Unpro-
fitable firms contract and are spurred to search harder, or more effectively. 
Our specific assumptions regarding these mechanisms enable us to structure 
the model as a Markov process. In each time period, each firm in the model 
is in a particular firm state characterized by values of two state variables: 
(1) its production technique, characterized by its coefficients of labor 
and capital input per unit output, (al, aK); (2) the firm's scale, charac-
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terized by the nonnegative, integral number of capital units the firm 
employs, f. There are finitely many possible decision rules, and also 
finitely many firms, but not al 1 of the firms need have positive scale 
in a particular period. The list of firm states in a particular time period 
is the industry state. Each firm employs its entire capital stock, with 
its current decision rule, to produce output. Consequently, an industry 
state implies a certain aggregate capital stock in use, rf.,
a J f.
a certain aggregate labor demand, L___Jj_ f., and a certain output, 1:--1.
aKj J aKj
The firms collectively face a supply-price schedule for labor, and it is 
assumed that the labor market clears in every period. Hence, to each 
industry state there corresponds a wage rate, quoted in units of output. 
From one time period to the next, the state of an individual firm 
changes according to probabilistic rules that depend on the initial state 
of the firm and its profitability. Profitability is determined by the 
initial state, the wage rate, and constant parameters. Since the industry 
state is the list of firm states, the transition probability rules for 
individual firms define, implicitly, the transition probabilities in the 
set of industry states. 
We discuss first, the transition rules for firms "in business," i.e., 
with positive capital stock. Assumptions governing entry will be mentioned 
1ater. (A parenthetical delta identifies parameters that have been varied 
in the experimental runs reported below.) 
(l) Technique Changes. 
The transition probability rules for productive techniques involve 
elements of satisficing behavior, local search, imitation, and profitability 
testing of alternatives. 
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a. Satisficing. 
Firms with positive capital in the current state retain the 
production technique of that state, with probability one, if their 
currently calculated gross return on capital exceeds . 16. This 
critical gross return may be regarded as the sum of three program 
parameters, the depreciation rate, o=.04, the "required dividend" 
rate R {o) and the "target rate of (net) return," symbolized 
TRR (o). Firms that do not make a gross return of. 16 undergo a 
probabilistic technique-change process. This process occurs in two 
stages, a search stage in which an alternative rule may be identified, 
and a testing stage in which the profitability of the alternative is 
compared with that of the initial rule. 
b. Local Search. 
Given that a firm is searching, it is either seeking incremental 
improvements of its present methods, or looking at what other firms 
are doing, but not both at the same time. In the former, "local 
search," case, the probabi I ity distribution is concentrated on tech­
niques close to the current one. The formula used for the distance 
between techniques h and h' is 
h h' h h' 
D( h , h ' ) = WT LI l og a - log al I + WTKI log aK - log aK I
L 
(where WTL + WTK = l) 
That is, distance is a weighed average of the absolute differences in 
the logs of input coefficients. This gives rise to diamond-shaped 
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equal distance contours in the space of logs of input coefficients. 
Employment of different values of WTL and WTK permits us to treat 
search with differing degrees of "bias" toward discovering capital 
or labor saving technologies. Probabilities for transitions from 
a given rule to other are then determined as a decreasing linear 
function of distance, subject to obvious nonnegativity conditions, 
an appropriate normalization, and introduction of a probability that 
no alternative technique will be found. The slope of this linear 
function is IN (o) where IN stand mnemonically for "ease of INv2ntion. 11 
The larger (less negative) is IN, the more 1ikely it is the search 
process will uncover technologies with input coefficients significantly 
different from the initial ones. 
c. Imitation. 
A searching firm may look to what other firms are doing. If it 
does, the probability that it will find a particular technique is 
proportional to the fraction of total industry output produced by 
that technique in the period in question. 
The actual transition probabilities for a firm that is searching 
then are a weighted average of the probabilities defined by "local 
search, 11 and the probabilities defined by i·ni tat ion. The re Iat i ve 
weights on local search and imitation are characterized by the parameter 
IM (~). A high value of IM denotes a regime where search is more 
likely to be over wh~t other firms are doing and less likely to be of 
the "local search 11 type, than in regimes where IM is low. 
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d. Profitability Testing. 
An alternative rule turned up by the search process is adopted 
by the firm only if it promises to yield a higher return, per unit 
capital, than the firm's current rule. (Since the firm's capital 
stock is independently determined, the return per unit capital criterion 
gives the same result as a test based on anticipated total profit.) 
The wage rate employed in this comparison is the one associated with 
the current industry state. There is an element of random error in 
the comparison: the capital and labor input coefficients employed 
in the test are not the true values for the alternative technique, 
but the products of the true values and realizations of independent 
normal deviates. A firm in business misjudges the input coefficient 
of an alternative technique by an amount that exceeds twenty percent 
about a third of the time. 
(2) Investment 
Our characterization of the determinants of changes in the sizes of 
firms can be described much more compactly. The capital stock of a firm 
with positive capital in the current state is first reduced by a random 
depreciation mechanism; each unit of capital is, independently, subject 
to a failure probability of D=.04 each period. The capital stock, thus 
reduced, is then increased by the firm's gross investment in the period. 
Gross investment is determined by gross profit, where gross profit is 
revenue minus wage bill minus required dividends. (More precisely, gross 
investment is gross profit rounded to the nearest integer, the rounding 
being necessary because capital stock is integer-valued and gross profit 
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is not.) This rule is applied even when gross profit is negative, subject 
only to the condition that the resulting capital stock not be negative. 
(3) Entry 
As indicated above, we make special assumptions about entry. A firm 
with zero capital in the current state is a potential entrant and "contemplates" 
the use of a production decision rule. If its decision rule imp! ies a gross 
rate of return to capital in excess of . 16, calculated at current prices, it 
becomes an actual entrant with probabi I ity .25. If it does enter, its 
capital stock is determined by a draw on a distribution that is uniform 
over the integers from 5 to 10. (Entry is relatively infrequent, and the 
contribution it makes to gross investment is minor when averaged over several 
periods.) Other firms (i.e., those contemplating rules that do not meet 
the rate of return test) remain at capital stock zero with probability one. 
The assumptions about search by potential entrants differ slightly from 
the assumptions about search by firms already in the industry; these will 
be mentioned when needed. 
(4) The Labor Market 
The only market in which the model's firms interact is the labor 
market. The prevailing wage rate influences the profitability of each firm, 
given the technique it is using, and, in turn, the behavior of the industry 
as a whole is a powerful, but not the only, influence on the wage rate. 
The simulation program admits all wage determination equations of the form 
w = a + b C 
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where t is the time period, Lt is the aggregate labor use in the period, 
and a, b, c, and g are constants. When g = 0, labor supply conditions 
over and a whole a process withare constant time the model as is Markov 
constant transition probabilities.· A nonzero g corresponds to changing 
labor supply conditions; the model as a whole remains a Markov process, but 
with time dependent transition probabilities. In the runs reported here, 
we have employed g = .0125, interpreted as a 1.25 percent per year increase 
in the labor supply forthcoming at a given wage. We have employed a=O 
and c=2, corresponding to a short run labor supply curve of constant 
elasticity equal to .5. Parameter b was set to .000018 for reasons explained 
in the following section. As may be obvious, these choices are not the 
result of a thorough analysis of the relations among population growth, 
labor force participation, hours worked, and wages. We believe that they 
are adequate for our present purposes; further discussion of this point is 
deferred to Section IV below. 
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We turn now to the calibration of this evolutionary model with the 
U.S. economic growth data analyzed by Solow. Our objectives in this 
quantitative exercise are limited, as is appropriate at the present state 
of development of this theory. Judged by their conformity to standard practice 
in growth theory and the theory of the firm, the assumptions of our modei 
are 11 wild. 11 What we seek to establish here is that the dynamic behavior of 
the model is not "wild" at all, once its quantitative linkage to a particular 
data set is established. We hope thereby to rebut the point so often made 
against a behavioral approach to the theory of individual decision units, 
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that it cannot be brought to bear on such high level phenomena as the 
4 
patterns of aggregate economic growth. 
The Solow data determined, first of all, the choice of the set of 
input coefficient pairs built into the model. The one hundred possible 
techniques were randomly chosen (from the uniform distribution) over a 
C 
square region in the space of logarithms of input coefficients. The 
region includes, with room to spare, all of the historical coefficients 
implied by Solow's data. This scatter is displayed in Figure l; and the 
square region corresponds to the range of values of al from .46 to 1.8 and 
of aK from 1.2 to 4.6. The actual time path of input coefficients, from 
Solow's data, is shown. 5 In selecting the region, we were concerned to 
leave room for the simulated results to depart from the historical ones 
without producing strong effects associated with proximity to the boundary 
of the region, but also to choose a region small enough so that a 
computat~onally plausible number of decision rules would provide reasonable 
density of coverage. The square chosen reflects our subjective balancing 
. "d . 6of t hese competing cons, erat1ons. 
The U.S. growth data also determined our choices of initial conditions. 
The initial input coefficients of firms in business were chosen so that 
they roughly averaged those revealed by Solow's data for 1909. 7 
For reasons of convenience, we chose to work with an aggregate capital 
stock of about 300 units. Given this choice of a unit of measurement for 
capital (roughly, 1 t,Jnit = .5 billion 1929 dollars), the choice of output 
and labor units was indicated by the desire to maintain direct comparability 
with historical values for the key ratios. Thus, given the initial capital 
stock and the input coefficients, initial labor input was determined. 
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We set the labor supply curve so that the initial price of the model's labor 
unit in terms of its output unit would roughly correspond to the price 
(in the Solow data) of a 1909 manhour in 1929 dollars. This condition 
yielded the coefficient of .000018 in the labor supply-price schedule, 
mentioned in the previous section. As mentioned earlier, we let the supply 
curve shift to the right at roughly the historical rate. 
Still another way in which the simulation is linked to the Solow 
data (and perhaps to reality) is that the depreciation and rate of return 
parameters employed are plausible. Solow at one point proposed three to 
five percent as a reasonable range for the depreciation rate, we apply a 
random failure probability of .04 to each capital unit in each-simulated 
year. The implied gross rates of return in Solow's data run about ten to 
twenty percent; our "search trigger" is pulled at rates below sixteen 
percent. 
The~e remain some important parameters that cannoi be calculated by 
reference to the Solow data, but whose qualitative influence can be anti­
cipated by considering the logical structure of the model. To explore the 
sensitivity of simulation outcomes to some of these parameters, we conducted 
an experiment involving 16 runs of 50 periods each. The sixteen runs comprise 
all possible combinations of levels of four experimental factors, with two 
levels for each factor. With this design, it is sensible to distinguish 
the different runs by numbering them in the binary system; run number 1111 
is the run with all factors set at the "one" levels. In the binary numbering, 
the levels of the four factors are recorded from right to left, so that, 
for example, run 0001 has the first factor at level one and the others at 
zero. 
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The fir.st experimental factor is parameter IN, a mnemonic for the 
ease of INnovation, measured by the slope of the decline of probability 
with distance in the local search mechanism. We designate x
1
N as the 
binary indicator of the level of IN where: 
XIN = 0 +-+IN= -6.0 
XIN = I+-+ IN= -4.5 
The larger (less negative) is IN, the less local the search, the "easier" 
is major innovation, and hence, one would hypothesize, the faster is the 
rate of technical change in the aggregate data I ikely to be. --
Factor two is the strength of the imitation component in the search 






is a mnemonic for the ease with which established firms can 
IMitate other firm~ technology and is measured by the probability weight 
on.imitation in the imitation-internal search choice; IM2 is the imitation 
weight for zero-scale firms (in general we did not assume these were 
equal). The settings are: 
Higher values of x1M shou,ld bind firms together in their techniques, low 
values lead to greater independence of the evolution of firms' techniques. 
The third factor is the cost of capital and involves parameters R 
(required dividend) and TRR (target rate of return over required dividends 
and depreciation). The levels are: 
XR = 0 +-+ R = .02 and TRR =. 10 
X = +-+ R = .06 and TRR = .06R 
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Thus, the sum of the two parameters is constant at .12; adding in the 
depreciation probability of .04 we have the constant 11 search trigger" 
value of. 16. The impact of different R values may be explained as follows. 
Imagine that two different simulated histories with different values of R, 
chance to pass through states with the same average input coefficients. 
The run with the higher value of R will tend to have the lower aggregate 
capital stock, because investment is determined by profits net of required 
dividends. Labor demand, and hence the wage rate, will be lower in the high 
R run. Thus, profitability tests of alternative techniques will favor more 
labor intensive techniques in the high R run~ And therefore, in the subse­
quent history of the two runs, the presumed initial equality of average 
input coefficients wi 11 be fo 11 owed by a tendency for the high R run to 
drift off in the relatively labor inten~ive direction, compared to the 
other. For this reason, and others, a higher value of R is hypothesized to 
produce a lower capital-labor ratio. 
The two levels of factor four correspond to two different distance 
functions in the space of input coefficients, and hence to different 
probabilities characterizing the local search mechanism. The parameters 
involved, \./TL and WTK are, respectively, the weights on the logarithmic 
differences of labor coefficients and of capital coefficients in the 
distance function (see formula on p. 8). The two levels are: 
+-+ WTL = .5 and WTK = .5 
+-+ WTL = .4 and WTK = .6 
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Thus, the zero level assumption is that there is no bias in the local 
search mechanism; proportional changes in the two coefficients are 
weighted equally. Level one makes differences in the labor input coeffi-
cient less important as a contribution ~o distance, hence makes rules 
with different labor coefficients closer neighbors. And hence, we hypo­
thesize, the level one cases should result in aggregate data that show 
faster decline in the average labor coefficient relative to the capital 
coefficient. 
All of the experimental runs were initiated with the same assignments 
of techniques to all thirty-five firms. In the eight runs with the high R 
values, the fifteen firms in business each had twenty units of capital. In 
the low R runs, firms in business each had twenty-two units of capital. 
These initial capital values were chosen to put the system in approximate 
"equi 1ibrium, 11 i.e., with roughly zero expected net investment in the 
8
initial period. To have started all runs at the same industry state, 
ignoring the implications of the different parameter values, would have_ 
been a straightforward but naive approach to the problem of achieving 
11 identical 11 initial conditions for the different runs. Drastic differences 
in the aggregate outcomes in the early periods would then have been imp! ied 
by the R differences; no such strong effects are visible in the results as 
they stand. 
IV 
The computer output describing the experimental simulation runs contains 
abundant quantitative detail and is rich in qualitative patterns. Firms 
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thrive and decline; new techniques appear, dominate the scene briefly and 
then fade away: time series for most aggregate data display strong trends, 
but also a good deal of short period fluctuation. The stack of paper 
describing the total of 800 years of synthetic history is over eight inches 
high. It is clear that it must be summarized fairly drastically for the 
purposes of this discussion. 
By way of illustration, we display in Table l some of the aggregate 
time series for a single run, 1111. · Several features of these results 
may be noted. The A series was calculated, a la Solow, on the contra­
factual assumption that.the time series was generated by a neutrally 
shifting neoclassical production function. The measured rate of technical 
change fluctuates quite sharply from period to period and occasionally 
turns negative. However, the number of negative values, and the range 
of the fluctuation, is smaller than in the Solow series. Thus, in spite 
of the absence of a production function and cost minimization from the 
underlying structure, and in spite of the presence of random elements in 
search and in profitability testing, the evolutionary model displays a· 
somewhat smoother pattern of technical change than the real data. The 
simulated series for the share of capital, on the other hand, displays 
considerably more volatility than the corresponding Solow data. This 
behavior may plausibly be attributed to the unrealistically effective 
functioning of our simulated labor market. If the wage rate were allowed 
to adjust only partially to labor market conditions, the impact of uncoordinated 
investment and decision rule changes by individual firms would show up 
partly in excess supply or demand for labor; the impact on the wage bill and 
9hence on the capital share, would be correspondingly muffled. 
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Table 2 presents data on each run for each of several variables, observed 
at period 40 of the run. JO Also displayed are the corresponding figures, where 
these exist, for the 36th period (1944) and the 40th period (1948) of the Solow 
data. 
It is plain that the simulation model does generate technical progress 
with rising output per worker, a rising wage rate and a rising capital labor 
ratio, and a roughly constant rate of return on capital. The rates of change 
produced correspond roughly to those in the Solow data. Also, some individual 
runs produce values quite close to the Solow values for the variables measured 
for example, runs 0101 and 0111. 
Figures 2 to 5 display the time paths of the average input coefficients 
generated by the sixteen runs. To keep the figures relatively uncluttered, 
the values are plotted for the initial period and at periods 5, 10, etc., 
thereafter. In Figure 6, the input coefficient track for one run (1110) is 
compared with the track imp I ied in the Solow data. The case shown is one 
in which there is close agreement at the initial point and also forty 
periods later, but there is a wide divergence in between. The divergence 
is associated with the fact that, while the simulated track gives the 
impression of taking a relatively constant direction, there is a sharp turn 
in the track of the Solow data, suggestive of a change in the underlying 
regime. The apparent break occurs between 1929 and 1934. Perhaps it would 
be asking too much of the simulation model, committed as it is to full employ­
ment, to reproduce that break. 
It seems interesting to ask: If a neoclassical economist believed the 
data generated by the simulatJon model to be real data, and tested his theory 
against the data, what would he conclude? This, of course, depends on the 
particular simulation run of data, and the particular test. But by and large 
it seems that he would believe that his theory had performed well. 
2 1 
TABLE 1 
SELECTED TIME SERIES, RUN 1111 (see key, next page) 
Year w- r SK- Q/L K/L 
A -
.45 . 102 .296 .64 1.87 1. 000 
2 .45 . l 14 .320 . 66 1. 86 1. 028 
3 .49 .092 .255 . 66 l.81 1. 032 
4 . 49 .091 .248 . 65 l. 78 1. 029 
5 .38 . 156 .450 .69 1.99 1. 056 
6 . 50 . 104 .290 . 70 1.96 1. 081 
7 . 52 .098 .264 . 71 1.90 1. 096 
8 .so • 123 • 325 . 74 1.94 1. 139 
9 .44 . 164 .440 . 78 2.09 1. 179 
10 .48 • 149 .399 . 79 2. 12 l. 192 
11 . 56 . 116 . 300 . 79 2.05 l. 205 
12 . 55 • 12 7 . 326 . 81 2.07 l. 224 
13 . 49 . 167 .432 . 85 2.21 1. 266 
14 .44 . 191 .518 . 91 2.47 l. 291 
15 . 53 • 154 .417 . 91 2.46 l. 291 
16 • 66 . 102 .259 . 89 2. 27 1. 305 
17 . 63 • 1 l 8 . 305 . 91 2.32 1.316 
18 . 61 • 132 • 341 . 92 2.38 1. 329 
19 .68 .098 .253 . 91 2.34 1. 324 
20 .58 . 153 ,399 . 96 2.51 1. 376 
21 .60 • 152 .393 . 99 2.57 l. 402 
22 . 59 . 157 .415 1. 02 2.68 1. 412 
23 . 76 .095 .244 l. 01 2.58 l. 420 
24 . 74 • l 07 • 271 1. 02 2.57 l. 437 
25 . 69 . l 30 • 329 1.03 2.61 l. 455 
26 . 70 . 123 .315 l. 02 2.62 1. 436 
27 .68 . 139 . 356 1.05 2.70 1. 464 
28 . 62 . 166 .438 1. 10 2.89 l. 491 
29 .68 • 148 . 385 1. 11 2.87 l. 508 
30 • 81 . 123 .296 1. 15 2.76 l. 585 
31 .78 • 147 • 346 l. 19 2.81 l. 640 
32 • 80 . 146 . 344 1.22 2.88 l. 66 7 
33 . 87 . 133 . 307 1. 25 2.88 I. 702 
34 • 90 . 122 . 280 l. 24 2.86 l. 701 
35 • 92 . 11 l .254 1. 28 2.84 l. 693 
36 . 89 • 135 .305 l. 34 2.89 l.741 
37 .87 • 157 .352 1. 42 3.00 1. 803 
38 .84 • 181 .406 1. 43 3. 18 1.872 
39 .97 . 143 • 319 1. 47 3. 17 1. 886 
40 .97 . 151 . 341 1. 53 3. 31 1. 913 
41 l.05 • 144 .313 1.56 3.32 1. 994 
42 1.09 • 142 • 306 1.60 3.38 2.028 
43 1. 10 • 146 . 315 1. 63 3.46 2.058 
44 1. 09 • 153 . 336 1.63 3,58 2. 082 
45 1. 22 . 116 • 250 1. 65 3. 52 2.083 
46 1. 16 .134 .298 l. 63 3.65 2. 089 
47 l. 33 .087 • 185 I. 65 3.47 2.096 
48 1.23 • 122 • 258 1.66 3- 51 2. 131 
49 l. 22 • 133 .279 1.69 3.55 2. l 6~ 
50 1. 2~ • 135 • 283 1. 72 3.61 : . 138 
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KEY: 
w = wage rate, 1929 dollars per man-hour 
r = gross rate of return on capital 
sK = capital share ( = 1 - labor share) 
Q/L = output-labor ratio (1929 dollars per man-hour) 
K/L = capital-labor ratio (1929 dollars per man-hour) 
A = Solow technology index. 
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TABLE 2 
Run A (40) (K/L)40 (al) 40 (aK) 40 ( C 4) 40 6w40 
0000 2.796 l. 727 .832 2. 32(, . 560 l. 4 
0001 3. 129 2.391 . 592 I. 851 . 521 2.5 
0010 2.519 l. 712 . 846 2. 131 .383 l. 6 
0011 4.242 2. 716 .477 2.025 . 387 3.2 
0100 2.035 1. 855 . 825 l. 678 .645 l. 8 
0101 2.695 2. 106 . 679 l. 829 .404 2.4 
0110 2. 686 I. 658 . 84 l 2.258 . 405 l. 4 
0111 2.703 2. 123 . 672 1. 817 . 388 2. l 
l 000 3.015 J. 746 •Boo 2. 411 . 476 2. l 
1001 4. 511 2.359 . 524 2.364 . 457 2.4 
1010 4.332 2. 098 . 600 2.599 .443 l.9 
101 l 4. 258 2.450 . 514 2. 190 . 325 2.8 
1100 3.212 1. 835 . 705 2.265 .491 I. 9 
1101 3.391 2. 190 . 600 2.034 . 518 2.6 
1110 3. 031- 1.963 . 705 2. l 36 . 394 l.9 
l 1 1 l 3.315 1.913 . 682 2.260 .327 l.9 
Solow 2.63 l. 856 . 675 1. 776 
( 1944) 
Solow 2.55 1. 810 .699 l. 784 l.7 
( I 948) 
Key: 
K/L = Capital-labor ratio. 
A = Solow technology index. (Solow figures for 1944 and 1948 are correct; 
the values originally published were in error.) 
al = Average labor input coefficient, L/Q. 
aK = Average capital 1nput coefficient, K/Q. 
= Four firm concentration ratio. (Initial value== .206.)c4 
6w = Rate of change of wages, percent per period. 
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Tables 3 and 4 display the results of fitting Cobb-Douglas production 
functions, by each of two methods, to the aggregate Q, K, Land capital 
share series for each experimental run. The Solow procedure was fol lowed in 
generating Table 3. The percentage neutral shift in the hypothetical aggre­
gate production function was calculated in each period, and the technology 
index A(t) constructed. The Index was then employed to purge the output 
data of technological change, and the log of adjusted output per labor unit 
was regressed on the log of capital per labor unit. The observations were 
taken from periods 5-45 of the simulation run, to give us a sample size the 
same as Solow's and to minimize possible initial-phase and terminal-phase 
effects on the outcomes. 
The regressions in Table 4 are based on an assumed exponential time 
trend in the technology index, and involves the logs of the absolute magni­
tudes rather than ratios to labor input. The same sample period was employed. 
The most noteworthy feature of these results is that the fits obtained 
in most of the cases are excellent: Half of the R2 values in Table 3 exceed 
.99, and more than half of those in Table 4 equal .999. The fact that there 
is no production function in the simulated economy is clearly no barrier to 
a high degree of success in using such a function to describe the aggregate 
series it generates. It is true that the fits obtained by Solow and others 
with real data are at least as good as most of ours, but we doubt that 
anyone would want to rest a case for the aggregate production function on 
2 11what happens in the third or fourth decimal place of R . Rather, this 
particular contest between rival explanatory sche~es should be regarded as 















































































COBB-DOUGLAS REGRESSIONS WITH TIME TREND 
log Q(t) =a+ bl log K(t) + b2 log L(t) + b3 t 



















































































A second feature of the results that requires comment is the rather 
low values of the estimated b coefficients in Table 3, which are, of course, 
the estimated exponents of capital in the Cobb-Douglas function. The Solow 
estimate is .353; none of ours are this high. Under the neoclassical inter­
pretation, this coefficient should equal the capital share when factor 
markets are in equilibrium. It is also known that if the capital share 
series is precisely constant, then the Solow adjustment procedure will 
result in a perfect fit by the Cobb-Douglas function and the regression 
coefficient will equal the value of the constant capital share (see Hogan). 
Thus, the question of the goodness of fit achieved by the Solow procedure 
can be regarded as providing a particular measure of the degree of variability 
in the capital share series. It might be thought that the question of the 
value of the regression coefficient obtained could correspondingly be 
regarded as involving the central tendency of the capital share series. 
In the simulation results, the capital share values do tend to run low by 
comparison with the historical values. However, it also appears that 
higher variability of the capital share series tends to result in a lower 
coefficient, with the mean of the capital share series held constant. 
This effect seems to be important in producing the simultaneous occurrences 
of relatively poor fits and low coefficients in Table 3. 13 It would not be 
surprising if there is a straightforward estimation bias involved here, but 
no proof of the existence of such a bias in the Solow procedure has come to 
our attention. 
Although the fits obtained with the alternative specification of the 
Cobb-Douglas function are excellent, the estimated coefficients in Table 4 
vary erratically from one case to the next. The coefficients of log Kare 
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much too high if the capital share is the basis of comparison, especially 
in the biased search runs. This pattern of good fits and coefficients that 
are implausible by neoclassical standards is not, however, peculiar to 
the analysis of simulation data generated by the evolutionary model. It has 
appeared when the same statistical specification is employed with real data. 
In the process of describing the experimental factors, we set forth 
a number of hypotheses concerning the effects of various parameters in the 
model. Although these hypotheses are plausibly based in the nx:>del 's logic, 
they are not strictly deducible (at least at present) from its assumptions~ 
The complexity of the interactions in the model, and its stochastic charac­
ter, make such deductions difficult. We are thus forced to treat the 
conformity of the model's behavior to our hypotheses as an empirical ques­
t ion. 
To explore this question -- and also to search for unanticipated 
patterns in the simulated behavior -- we adopted a linear regression approach. 
The independent variables were the four experimental factors, represented 
by a 0-1 dummy variable; various dependent variables were considered. This 
is clearly a very simple stochas,tic model of the simulated data; there are 
good reasons to doubt that interaction effects of the experimental factors 
are absent, or that the various stochastic features of the simulation model 
are neatly encapsulated in an additive disturbance term. However, we have 
a sample size of sixteen; with four factors allowing for even the first 
order interaction effects would reduce the degrees of freedom to precarious 
levels. The simpler model is adequate for exploring the gross features of 
the logic of the system, such as the hypotheses mentioned in the description 
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of the experimental factors. Subtler hypotheses should probably be tested 
with both a better specification and more extensive (and expensive) observa­
tions. 
The first dependent variable considered is the aggregate capital-labor 
ratio at period 40 of the run. The regression result is: 
K 
( /L)40 = 3.353 + ,577 XIN + .288 XIM - .717 XR +. 7825 XWT 
(. 017) (. 19) ( . 00 5) ( . 00 3) 
2
(R = . 766) 
Here XIN is the dummy variable for the first experimental factor IN and so 
forth. Figures in parentheses are significance levels. The hypothesized 
effects of factors three and four are strongly confirmed, as the input 
coefficient diagrams lead us to expect. A higher price of capital, considered 
as a return that must be paid out and is not available for reinvestment, does 
lead to a substantially more labor intensive mode of production after a period 
of time. Considered as a growth rate effect, the rise in R from .02 to .06 
(and the associated decline in TRR) ,. produces a decrease of .3 percentage 
points per period in the rate of change of the capital-labor ratio. The 
effect of the labor-saving search bias introduced by factor four is of compar­
able magnitude but, of course, in the opposite direction. 
The magnitude and significance level of the coefficient of XIN comes as 
something of a surprise. Why should the capital-labor ratio be higher in a 
system in which search is less local? On reflection, one possible answer to 
this question seems to be the following: The general direction of the path 
traced out in input-coefficient space does not depend on the localness of 
search. However, the rate of movement along the path is slower if search is 
more local. Therefore, given that the path is tending toward higher capital-labor 
ratios (as a consequence of the level chosen for Rand the neutrality or 
labor-saving bias of search), the capital-labor ratio that results after a 
given number of periods is lower when search is more local. This explanation 
imp! ies that the coefficient of x
1
N really measures an interaction effect; 
the impact of the first experimental factor depends on the particular levels 
chosen for the third and fourth. Another possible answer is more 11 Schumpe­
ter i an.11 A high rate of technical progress may produce a high level of (dis­
equilibrium) profits, which in turn are invested. The resulting increase 
in thedemandfor labor results is a higher wage, and deflects the results at 
profitability comparisons in the capital-intensive direction. These possible 
answers are not, of course, mutually exclusive. 
Effects on the period 40 value of the Solow technology index are 
characterized by the following regression equation: 
(. 0006) (. 59) (. 07) (. 73)
As anticipated, the higher value of IN produces a higher measured rate of 
technical change. The only other factor that seems to influence the measured 
technological change is the required dividend, with a higher required divi­
dend tending to reduce the technology level achieved. Ex post analysis of 
this effect indicates that it is associated with our particular choice of 
a distance function in the space of input coefficients, and would disappear 
if ordinary Euclidean distance were employed. With our choice of distance 
function, the Solow rate of technical change tends to be minimized when factor 
shares are equal and maximized at the extreme values of zero and one. The 
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higher value of R leads to capital share values closer to one-half, hence 
to slower progress. With circular distance contours, Solow measured progress 
is independent of the shares. 
The failure of the higher imitation weight to contribute significantly 
to technical change may appear surprising, at first thought. However, the 
model contains an offset to the favorable effects of a more rapid spread of 
better methods. The increased weight on imitation in the search process 
implies a decreased weight on local search. Thus, the firms that are tech­
nically most advanced at a given point of time have slower progress under a 
high imitation regime. They do less local searching, and the techniques 
they turn up through imitation are typically inferior to the ones they already 
have, and do not pass the profitability test. The high imitation condition 
does not merely accelerate the technical tortoises, but also makes the hares 
spend more time looking smugly behind them. ~hus the race turns out to be 
closer, but not faster. 
Mention of the leveling effects of imitation leads naturally to the 
question of the firm-size distribution. The dependent variable for this 
analysis is the share of the largest four firms in total capital, at period 
40. The regression result is 
C4(40) = .495 - .058 x,N - . 127 x,M + .0028 XR - .033 \T 
(.04) (.0004) (.91) (.22) (R 2 = . 741)
The imitation effect is clearly the most pronounced. We have suggested an 
explanation for this effect i·n terms of the 11 closer race. 11 There are actually 
two distinct mechanisms in the simulation model by which a closer technical 
race tends to keep concentration 1own, and both are quite plausible as hypo­
theses about economic reality. First, as among firms in business, similarity 
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rn technique implies similarity in cost conditions, hence in profit rates, 
and hence in growth rates. Thu~ acloser race implies a smaller dispersion 
of firm growth rates and lower concentration. But secondly, potential entrants 
also stay closer to the technical leaders when imitation is easy, and (per­
ceived) opportunities for profitable entry occur more frequently. Since 
entry tends to occur in a particular (and relatively low) scale range, the 
-amount of capacity added by entry is higher when entry is higher. Considera­
tions of overall industry 11 equilibrium11 imply that the infusion of capacity 
through entry is partially offset by lower investment by the firms previously 
in business. Since the latter are typically larger than the entrants, 
concentration is reduced. 
The effect of x
1
N on c4 is prob~bly also a reflection of entry condi­
tions, but in this case the result is more in the nature of an artifact of 
the simulation set-up. In each of our runs, the firms in business start 
off with the same technical lead over the potential entrants. That lead 
is more easily overcome when the race is faster (XIN = l), hence there is 
more entry, and lower concentration. 
The above analysis of the influences on the concentration of firms is 
illustrative of a fundamental difference between the neoclassical and evolu­
tionary approaches to growth theory. Neoclassical theory is aimed at macro 
phenomena and its micro details are instrumental to its macro purposes. 
Evolutionary theory treats the micro processes as fundamental, and the macro 
aggregates as aggregates. Hence, it encompasses a wider range of phenomena; 
its treatment of the micro details is intended to be subject to test. Thus, 
for example, we can treat our simulation model not only as an abstract 
account of the phenomena of aggregate economic growth, but also as an abstract 
account of the size distribution of firms. 
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Thus viewed, some features of the simulation model suggest a family resem-
blance to the stochastic theories of the size distribution. 
14 
In particular, 
individual firms' histories reflect the cumulative effect of a number of 
random occurrences, and the assumption that gross investment depends on 
gross economic profit corresponds roughly to Gibrat 1 s law. Thus, it should 
be no surprise to find that the distribution late in the run is highly skewed. 
On the other hand, our model was not 11 aimed 11 at the size distribution prob­
lem; the stochastic process involved is not a highly stylized one chosen for 
analytic tractability in size distribution analysis, but represents the 
combination of a set of assumptions with independent sources in economic 
reality. The fates of the firms are linked through the labor market; the 
random elements involved are not just a complication of a simple deterministic 
structure, but are central to the model 1 s story about technological change. 
Thus, while it may not be surprising that the model produces reasonable­
looking size distributions, neither is it an obvious foregone conclusion. 
Figure 7 shows plots of firm size (scale) against firm rank, on double­
log paper. A straight 1 ine in a plot of this type corresponds to the Pareto 
distribution law. As has been emphasized by ljiri and Simon, e~pirical 
firm-size distributions tend to depart from the Pareto result; specifically, 
empirical plots tend to be curved, and concave down. Clearly, the simulation 
results have this characteristic. 
In a preliminary report on this study (1973), we interpreted this 
concavity in the terms suggested by lji ri and Simon; specifically, that it 
is a reflection of the existence of serial correlation in individual firm 
growth rates. Such correlations exist in our model, since the local search 
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mechanism tends to produce serial correlation in unit cost levels, hence in 
profit rates, and hence in pioportional growth rates. Recently, however, 
Vining has argued convincingly that the concavity produced by the lj iri­
Simon stochastic process is properly interpreted as the consequence of 
negative correlations between size and growth rates, arising indirectly 
through common correlations with firm ages. This leaves the interpretation 
of our own simulation results rather· up in the air. However, the hypothesis 
suggested by Vining's work is that the concavity is ultimately traceable 
to the fact that the total size of our simulated economy is bounded by 
its labor supply curve. Negative correlations between a firm's size and 
its growth rate arise by way of labor demand, the wage rate, and hence 
profitability. The larger the firm, and the less elastic is labor supply, 
the tighter this linkage is. 
V 
This paper presents a progress report rather than a completely articulated 
theory. Our simulation model is no more the last word on the evolutionary 
theory of economic growth than Solow's 1957 article was the last word on 
the neoclassical theory. In other papers, closely related to this one, we 
pursue somewhat different I ines of development of the basic ideas. In 
"Factor Price Changes and Factor Substitution in an Evolutionary Model" we 
discuss and formally analyze the search and selection mechanisms of factor 
substitution in a sectoral model. "Neoclassical vs. Evolutionary Theories 
of Economic Growth: Critique and Prospectus 11 presents a more genera I dis­
cussion of the two approaches to the understanding of economic growth. 
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More recently, in "Dynamic Competition and Technical Progress," we have 
studied an industry model in which the costs of both research and imitation 
efforts are explicitly recognized and realized rates of technical progress 
are the results of a complex interaction between exogenously arising oppor­
tunities and endogenous influences on the gains from research and imitation 
activity. 
So far as the particular model in this paper is concerned, there are 
clearly many specific assumptions and features that will be modified or 
totally abandoned as our work progresses. We already have a little I ist, 
{and they'd none of them be missed). 
One way to interpret the message of the present paper is to regard it 
as underscoring the seriousness of the difficulty that is called, in a 
narrower context, the identification problem. Very different structures 
can generate simi Jar statistical patterns; a world without a production 
function can, for example, mimic much of the behavior of a world that has 
one. Or, a world full of firms that can determine, approximately, whether 
a proposed alternative is more or less profitable than the status quo may 
behave in some ways similarly to a world in which firms unerringly pick 
optimum positions from continuums of possibilities. But a point that is 
either little known or taken very lightly is this: The identification 
problem is much exacerbated when economic reality is first divided into 
fragments for purposes of theoretical analysis and the fragments are then 
intensively analyzed with the aid of assumptions that are justified primarily 
by the claim that the (fragmentary) evidence is patterned "as if11 the assump­
tions were true. 
4 l 
In developing a special-purpose model for a particular fragment, the 
theorist denies himself the full benefit of available information on the 
structure of economic reality. Thi5 may not detract much from the ability 
to get good fits to a given data set, but it makes the predictive power of 
the model vulnerable to changes occurring in the neglected part of the 
environment. And the family of models and empirical findings thus produced 
is lacking in connectedness to a degree that severely I imits its power as 
a tool for analyzing the coherent realities of particular industries or 
if11sectors. An appeal to the "as argument should be construed as an 
admission that the attempt to identify the true structure has been abandoned. 
The logic of the standard arguments in favor of trying to identify the true 
structure then applies and the question is how much weight they are to be 
given in the particular substantive area involved. 
The issue is not "theory versus realism." What we have set forth 
and analyzed here is a highly abstract, drastically simplified theoretical 
model of a progressive economy. No one could confuse one of our simulated 
firms with, say, General Motors. We can only claim that certain empirical 
data are patterned 11as if" General Motors and other real firms were I ike 
our simulated ones. But we invoke this argument at quite a different level 
than is typical in economic theorizing; our story is highly abstract, but 
clearly much less abstract than the stories theories usually tell. And, 
concurrently with the change the of abstraction, havein level we thrown 
aside a large body of orthodox conceptual apparatus and introduced new 
concepts that seem to us to provide a superior language for discussing 
events at the lower level of abstraction. We have produced an account of 
economic growth and technical change that is simultaneously consistent 
(a) in quantitative terms, with the broad features of a certain body of 
aggregate data; (b) qualitatively, with such phenomena as the firm-size 
distribution, the existence of cross-sectional dispersion in capital-labor 
ratios and in efficiency, and patterns of innovation and diffusion of 
techniques; and (c) at leait metaphorically, with the empirical I iterature 
on firm decision making. These fragments of economic reality, at least, 
need not be regarded as posing isolated problems to be addressed through 
special-purpose assumptions. The model's consistency with disparate types 
of data indicates, in our view, that it is not merely consistent with the 
data of any one type, but rather bears a fairly intimate relationship to 
"what is really going on out there." 
r 
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1. See Kuhn, especially Chapter 8 and Chapter 12. 
2. We have discussed the general perspective at some length in another 
paper (1974) and wil 1 only sketch it here. 
3. This is a very brief summary of the theorem, and omits mention of 
important assumptions. 
4. Indeed, we would like to make this point stick the other way: It is 
neoclassical theory that suffers from 1imited scope, because it is so 
remote from the actual dynamic behavior of individual units. This 
argument is a major theme of our 1974 paper. 
5. In converting the Solow data to input coefficient form, we allowed for 
the point made in the final footnote (p. 320) of Solow 1 s article; 
namely, that his capital and output series are not in the same 
constant dollars. We converted to a consistent 1929 valuation basis, 
employing ihe price deflator for total GNP to adjust the series involving 
quantities with the dimensions of output. 
6. A slight compromise of the random choice procedure was made: The 
scatter chosen was one of four generated, and it was selected because 
it was most free'of 11 holes 11 -- areas of the square in which no techniques 
occurred. 
I I 
7. More precisely, the attempt was made to set initial values so that 
period 5 of the simulation run would approximately agree with the 
1909 values. 
8. Actually, the 10% increase in initial capital is a slight overadjust­
ment for the decline in R -- unavoidable because of the discreteness 
of capital and the decision to start all firms initially in business 
with equal capital. 
9. It may also be the case that the Solow capital share data are 
unrealistically smooth; this possibility is certainly suggested by 
his remarks on the sources of the data. 
10. The reason for focusing on values observed late in the run is to allow 
plenty of time for the different parameter settings to display their 
distinctive influences on the industry state. The reason for observing 
at period 40 rather than, e.g., period 50 is that a few of the runs 
display, in the late periods, clear "boundary effects 11 associated with 
proximity of average input coefficients to the edge of the region from 
which the decision rules were chosen. 
11. If anyone does, we might reply by reiterating the comment made above 
to the effect that the 11 real 11 capital share series may well be inaccurate 
and smoother than an accurate series would be; this could accou~t for 
the difference in fit. 
12. In recent work, Franklin Fisher has also been engaged in exploring, 
through simulation, the question of why the aggregate production 
function model seems to fit so well when its assumptions are so dubious. 
However, his primary concern 1s with the assumptions that would justify 
capital aggregatron, and the model he simulates is considerably more 
orthodox than ours. It involves, for example, equilibrium allocations 
of labor among firms, in every time period. 
iii 
13. The poorest fit in Table 3 occurs for run 0111. For this run, the mean 
of the capital share series in the sample period is .288 -- almost ten 
percentage points above the estimated coefficient. 
14. See, e.g., the discussion in Scherer, pp. 125-30, and the simulation 
results there reported. 
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